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En este artículo, analizamos el desempeño reciente, las perspectivas y algunas opciones de 
política para dos programas de seguridad social en Uruguay: jubilaciones (pensiones) y 
seguro de desempleo. Revisamos el impacto de estos programas en el gasto público, 
incluyendo las tendencias recientes y las tendencias que se esperan para el futuro, y en la 
desigualdad del ingreso. Realizando microsimulaciones, evaluamos el impacto fiscal y, en 
algunos casos, el impacto en equidad de algunas opciones de política. 
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In this paper we analyze the recent performance, perspectives and some policy options for 
two public social security programs in Uruguay: pensions and unemployment insurance. 
We review the impact of these programs on public expenditure, including recent and 
expected future trends, and on income inequality. Performing microsimulations, we 
evaluate the fiscal impact, and in some cases the equity impact, of some policy options. 
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In this paper we analyze the recent performance, perspectives and some policy options for 
two public social security programs in Uruguay: pensions and unemployment insurance. 
We review the impact of these programs on public expenditure, including recent and 
expected future trends, and on income inequality. We also evaluate the fiscal impact, and in 
some cases the equity impact, of some policy options. 
 
Uruguayan governments have traditionally been very active in social protection. This 
orientation did not fade out despite the more liberal stance in economic policy that tended 
to be adopted in Uruguay, like in most Latin American countries, in the last two decades. 
On the contrary, public expenditure on social programs grew faster than GDP, and this was 
so not only during the recent recession in which GDP plummeted, but also during the 
period of rapid growth previous to the recession.  
 
Pensions account for most of this expansionary trend. They were already the largest 
component of public social expenditure in the eighties, but in the early nineties the lagged 
indexation of pensions caused an enormous rise in the purchasing power of pensions during 
the disinflation process. 
 
In 1995, the coalition government passed a law to reform the pension program, introducing 
individual savings accounts to complement the previous exclusively pay-as-you-go public 
system. The indexation mechanism was not touched though, for it would have been against 
the constitution to do that. Public expenditure on pensions did not rise as a percentage of 
GDP for a couple of years, but it did not fall either and it grew again as a percentage of 
GDP when the recession began in 1999. It was not until the 2002 devaluation caused a 
drastic fall in wages and thus in pensions that public expenditure on pensions significantly 
fell as a percentage of GDP. 
 
In Uruguay the coverage of the pension programs among the elderly is wide by Latin 
American standards, but it also seems to be wide compared to other public social programs 
in Uruguay. Measuring coverage is not an easy task, and comparing coverage of different 
kind of programs can be risky, but there is some evidence that other programs reach the 
target population to a significantly lesser extent than do pensions.
3 The incidence of poverty  
among the elderly is much lower than among any other age group (Forteza, 2004). The 
comparatively wide coverage and the rising value of pensions during most of the last two 
decades indicate that the expansion of public expenditure on this particular program was 
not just driven by demography. Rather it was a deliberate policy option that the country 
adopted during the democratic period that began in 1985. Accounts that we have of the 
Uruguayan economic policy process during that period support this view (Forteza et al 
2004, among others). 
 
                                                 
3  This is indeed the case of unemployment insurance, the other program we analyze in this paper.   5 
 
By its very nature, unemployment insurance is a program of a smaller order of magnitude 
than pensions. Even though it protects most workers against the risk of losing their jobs, 
only those workers who are actually made redundant are normally eligible to receive the 
benefit, and even then only for a limited period. But the small size of the program in 
Uruguay seems to go well beyond that. Like in other Latin American countries, most 
unemployed workers in Uruguay do not receive any unemployment benefit. There is 
awareness of the problem, and the government and several political and social actors have 
made proposals to reform this program. 
 
After this introduction, in section 2 we briefly describe the recent trends in public social 
spending. In section 3, we analyze pensions and assess some policy options in terms of both 
public expenditure and equity. We evaluated several parametric changes one by one, rather 
than a whole policy package. This is partly because of the analytic goal of these exercises, 
but also because proposing a comprehensive reform was well beyond the scope of this 
project. In section 4, we analyze the unemployment insurance programs. Like in the 
pensions section, we briefly describe the programs, analyze recent and projected trends and 
study their impact on equity. There are several proposals to reform the existing programs in 
Uruguay. We summarized and compared these proposals and made a preliminary attempt at 
estimating their fiscal impact. These estimations are even more tentative than previous ones 
because the proposals we are considering have not yet been formulated as bills. 
Nevertheless, we think that we can give an idea of the orders of magnitude involved. We 
provide a summary and conclusions in section 5. The methodological details of some 
estimations are explained in the appendix. 
2  Spending on Uruguay’s Social Insurance Programs 
 
Since 1985, total social expenditure has been over 50 percent of the total expenditure of the 
Central Government plus Public Social Security Institutions (CG-SS). Public social 
expenditure has been rising throughout this period, reaching 21 percent of GDP in 2002, 
almost 70 percent of the total expenditure of the CG-SS. It is worth noticing that the great 
majority of this expenditure is on social security and assistance, which also shows an 
expansionary trend (15.8 percent of GDP in 2002, over half the total expenditure). The 
other social programs, education, health, housing and other social services, are also tending 
to rise but they are still rather small programs and in all they account for less than 20 
percent of total expenditure (Table 1).
4 
 
Over the whole period, the old age, survival and disability insurance programs (OASDI) 
amounted to between 77 and 80 percent of total public expenditure on social security. 
These programs rose much faster than GDP during the democratic period that began in 
1985. Total expenditure on public and private OASDI programs came to 8.4 percent of 
GDP in 1986 and reached a peak of 14.9 percent of GDP in 2001. Other programs, such as 
unemployment insurance and health, have also been increasing, but they are still rather 
                                                 
4 According to other estimations, public social expenditure may have reached 25 percent of GDP. See 
Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza (2004, box 1) for a discussion of different measures of public social 
expenditure in Uruguay.    6 
 
small (0.6 and 1.6 percent of the GDP in 2002, respectively). It follows that the main cause 
of the rise in both social and total expenditure of the CG-SS is the growth of programs in 
the social security system, in particular the biggest one: OASDI (Table 2). Even stronger 
expansionary trends can be identified in private pension programs during the nineties 
(Table 3). 
 
In Uruguay today, the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS) accounts for about 90 percent of 
total public expenditure on social security and about 75 percent of total private plus public 
expenditure on social security. The rise in the purchasing power of pensions and, to a lesser 
extent, the demographic trends in the country put growing pressure on the BPS budget 
during the nineties. The recession in the economy added to the difficulties between 1999 
and 2003. The deficit of the BPS grew much faster than GDP in this period, reaching a 
maximum of almost five percent of GDP in 2002 (Table 4). The devaluation in June 2002 
and the connected drop in the real wages pushed the purchasing power of pensions and 
expenditure on the social security institutions down during the last couple of years. The 
BPS deficit started to decrease in 2003 and it is expected to shrink even more in 2004. 
3 Pensions 
 
3.1  Description of the Program
5 
"In 1995, the Uruguayan parliament passed a bill for the reform of the main pensions 
program of the country. By that time, this program served almost ninety percent of all the 
pensions paid in Uruguay (Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza, 2004). Starting in 1967, this 
program was run by a public body that was autonomous of the government called the 
Banco de Previsión Social (BPS). In the pre-reform program, there were defined benefits 
and a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financial regime. 
 
The reform initiated in 1995 introduced a savings account pillar and modified key 
parameters of the  PAYG pillar. As a general rule, members with wages below a threshold 
continue to be served exclusively by the public-PAYG pillar unless they explicitly opt to 
deposit half of their personal contributions in a savings account. Up to now, most workers 
in this situation have taken this option, and they are currently contributing half and half to 
both pillars. Members with higher wages are obliged to make personal contributions to both 
pillars. Employers' contributions go exclusively to the public-PAYG pillar. Consequently, 
low-wage workers who did not opt for the savings accounts receive their full pension from 
the BPS, while other workers' pensions are financed by both the BPS and the funds 
accumulated in their savings accounts. According to estimations made in the BPS 
(Camacho, 1997), the public pillar will still be paying roughly three quarters of the 
pensions of this mixed program when the reformed system reaches maturity. 
 
The public-PAYG pillar was reformed in several important ways. As a general rule, the 
accessibility conditions were tightened, both on paper and in practice. The required 
minimum age for women to receive a contributory pension was raised from 55 to 60, and 
                                                 
5 Taken from Forteza (2004).   7 
 
the minimum number of years of effective contributions required to receive the pension 
was raised from 30 to 35 for both women and men. The administration of the system was 
significantly improved, which has meant, among other things, that the accessibility 
conditions are currently better controlled. The formulae used to compute the pension were 
changed. Minimum and maximum pensions paid by the public pillar were raised. The 
replacement rate was made more sensitive to retirement age and the years of contribution, 
i.e. it was reduced for workers retiring at the minimum required age and years of 
contributions and raised for workers who decide to retire later. Finally, the number of years 
of contributions considered in computing the initial pension was raised. Before the reform, 
the so-called "basic pension wage" (the figure that multiplies the replacement rate to 
produce the initial pension) was the average of the wages on which the last three years of 
contributions were made. After the reform, the formula takes into account the last ten years 
of contributions and the twenty years of highest contributions. With this change, the 
reformers aimed at reducing incentives to under-report earnings in most of working life and 
to over-report earnings in the last three years prior to retirement." 
 
3.2 Projected  Spending 
One of the main motivations for the reform was the upward trend in public expenditure on 
pensions. Between 1990 and 1995, the government raised its total spending on social 
security by more than four percentage points of GDP, and most of this was for pensions. 
The lagged indexation of pensions to wages in a context of declining inflation was a key 
determinant of the growth in expenditure on pensions. Among other objectives, the reform 
designed in 1995 tried to put a stop to this expansionary trend. 
 
It was expected that BPS spending would not decline immediately after the reform, because 
of its gradualism. Moreover, the BPS deficit was expected to rise initially due to the 
immediate reduction in contributions held by the institution, which was the counterpart of 
the re-routing of part of the contributions to the savings account pillar.  
 
There have been several attempts to project the budget of the BPS with and without the 
reform (Camacho, 1997; Caristo and Forteza, 2003; Forteza, 2004; among others). Most 
studies tend to conclude that the reform is likely to reduce BPS spending very slowly and to 
temporarily raise the deficit, and only to start reducing it after several years (figure 1).  
 
The sustainability issue is not definitely settled, though. There is of course the usual 
concern and warnings about the scope and validity of this type of exercise. Assumptions 
will never strictly hold completely and even if the researcher performs careful sensitivity 
analysis it is not easy to cover all the possibilities. But in the case of Uruguay, the 
difficulties in this type of exercise are particularly significant, mainly because of the big 
gap that existed before the reform between de jure and de facto pension policies. What 
simulation models usually do is to reproduce the behavior of the system under a certain set 
of norms, but it is very difficult to do this properly when policies in practice significantly 
differ from the norms on paper. In previous documents, we emphasized that most of the 
medium to long run expected improvement in the BPS budget after the reform stems from 
the projected decline in pensions paid to individuals who did not complete the contributions 
required to access the pension. The main reason to expect this improvement to take place is   8 
 
that the scope for this type of manipulation of the benefits was drastically reduced with the 
organization of work history records. However, the saving this may produce in the future 
crucially depends on the magnitude of the overspending of the BPS caused by this type of 
abuse in the past, and this is something that we can only indirectly and very roughly 
estimate.  
 
The recent economic crisis adds to the uncertainty of the existing projections. As is 
common practice, studies done on the Uruguayan pension programs are mostly meant to 
capture middle and long run trends, and not short run economic cycles. This is not 
necessarily a serious problem when the goal is to analyze fiscal sustainability, but it does 
introduce some noise that makes it more difficult to evaluate the accuracy of the existing 
projections. It is not obvious whether departures of the real figures from the projections can 
be ascribed to the economic cycle or should be taken as a signal that the system is in a trend 
different to what was expected. In particular, recent BPS deficits account for a greater share 
of GDP than was expected according to our projections. Most of this negative performance 
seems to be due to the deep recession that the country has gone through in recent years 
(Forteza, 2004), and as such it should be expected to reverse, but the situation requires 
further scrutiny.  
 
To sum up, existing projections suggest that the expenditure and the deficit of the BPS will 
decline as a share of GDP in the near future. This declining trend should stem from the 
economic recovery and the gradual replacement of pensioners of the pre-reform regime by 
new pensioners. Nevertheless, there is enough uncertainty involved in these projections as 
to make it advisable to explore some policy options to reduce expenditure. We consider 
some of these options below, after analyzing the equity impact of the current pensions 
program. 
 
3.3 Equity  Impact 
Public pension programs have the potential to perform significant redistribution of income. 
This is particularly so in countries like Uruguay in which the programs are large and cover 
a significant proportion of the population (Table 1). Almost half of the households received 
at least one pension, and pensions accounted for almost a quarter of total household 
earnings in 2003, according to the household survey (Table 5). The figures are higher for 
the upper deciles: the proportion of households receiving pensions was more than double 
and the proportion of pensions in household earnings was almost three times more in the 
tenth (highest) decile as compared to the first (lowest) decile. But, on the other hand, 
households receiving pensions were significantly more numerous and the average age of 
their members was significantly lower in the lower deciles, suggesting that pension 
earnings might spill over to other members of the family and particularly to children more 
in  lower than in upper decile households (Table 6). 
 
Public pensions usually redistribute income both across generations and across individuals 
of the same generation. We address inter-generational redistribution computing 
"generational accounts" (see, among others, Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1994; 
Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz, 1999; Kotlikoff and Raffelhuschen, 1999). This 
methodology basically consists of computing the present value of net transfers between   9 
 
individuals and the pensions program. We also used generational accounting to analyze 
intra-generational redistribution, computing different accounts for different subsets of 
workers. We complemented this type of approach with an analysis of the contribution of 
the pensions program to income inequality.  
 
There is ample evidence that PAYG pension systems have redistributed enormous amounts 
towards the initial generations, those who began the system, from the generations that 
followed. The programs currently face payment commitments well above the expected 
collection from social security contributions. One difficult issue the pension policy must 
deal with in most modern mature programs is how to distribute this inherited burden among 
current and future generations. In particular, regaining fiscal sustainability to a large extent 
involves raising the burden that current generations must bear to reduce the burden to be 
left to future generations.  
 
In a recent study, Forteza (2003) concludes that the 1995 reform of the BPS pension 
program will significantly reduce the fiscal burden that future generations will have to bear, 
mainly because of the tightening of the conditions under which current generations access 
pensions. This tightening is more in practice than on paper and it has to do with 
administrative controls and particularly with work history. The main impact of the reform 
will be on individuals who under the old rules would have gotten a pension without having 
fulfilled the required conditions. They are not expected to get the contributory pension 
under the new regime.  
 
Formal workers, those who strictly abide by the laws, will on average experience 
comparatively minor changes, although some groups will be considerably affected. The 
reform benefited males and negatively affected females. This is consistent with the 
reformers’ goal of eliminating the preferential treatment that the old regime granted to 
females. As to income levels, the reform benefited low and, even more, high-income formal 
workers. The latter gained with the introduction of the savings pillar, the raising of the 
upper bounds on pensions paid by the public pillar, and the reduction in payroll taxes above 
a certain threshold. Low-income workers benefited because of the increase in minimum 
pensions and the bonuses granted to low paid workers who voluntarily adhere to the 
savings account pillar. 
 
We also analyzed the contribution of pensions to income inequality. Unlike in generational 
accounting, this analysis does not provide an assessment of the lifetime transfers of the 
individuals to and from social security, but it gives more detailed information on current 
transfers than the study described in the paragraphs above. Besides, this analysis uses 
information from household surveys and does not depend so heavily on assumptions made 
to build a simulation model. The Uruguayan household survey does not distinguish 
different pension programs, so this analysis mixes the BPS programs (including the 
relatively small non-contributory old age BPS pension program) with other programs in 
Uruguay (the BPS handles about 90 percent of total recipients and about 80 percent of total 
payments of pensions in the country). We estimated the contribution of different sources of 
income to total inequality, using the methodology proposed by Shorrocks (1982). In order 
to consider the whole effect of the social programs, we measured pensions and other   10 
 
government social programs as net transfers, i.e. as benefits received minus taxes paid to 
finance the programs (see the methodological appendix for details). 
 
According to the results summarized in Table 7 (left panel: Estimation 1) pension programs 
in Uruguay contributed to reducing inequality by 12 percent in 2003. This effect can be 
explained in terms of the negative correlation of net pensions to total earnings (both 
measured as per capita household earnings). In other words, high-income households 
received on average lower pensions net of taxes paid to finance the program than low-
income households. Besides this, unlike other transfers programs, pension programs are big 
enough, and present sufficient variation across households, to decisively impact on 
inequality (the standard deviation of net pensions is almost a quarter of that of total 
earnings). The impact of pensions on inequality was smaller in previous years: about -10 
percent in 2001 and -11 percent in 2002.
6  
 
The household survey does not provide information on taxes paid and so we had to make 
some simple assumptions to estimate net transfers. The estimations presented in the left 
panel in Table 7 are based on the assumption that households pay indirect taxes in 
proportion to their total earnings, but it is probably more realistic to assume that indirect 
taxes are proportional to household spending. If the rate of savings were an increasing 
function of earnings, and taxes were proportional to spending rather than to earnings, the 
first assumption would overestimate the taxes paid by richer households. The contribution 
of pensions to reducing inequality would thus be lower than what the above estimation 
shows, for richer households would not be contributing as much as is assumed in that 
estimation.  
 
In order to evaluate this possible bias, we did a second computation in which we estimated 
an expenditure function and assumed that payments of indirect taxes are proportional to 
spending rather than to earnings. The expenditure function was estimated on data from an 
expenditure survey conducted by the INE in 1994 (this is the most recent information we 
have). The estimated expenditure function is presented in the methodological appendix. As 
expected, households with higher income have smaller expenditure-earnings ratios. If 
indirect taxes are roughly proportional to spending, the estimated expenditure function 
means that indirect taxes are regressive in the sense that the share of earnings devoted to 
pay these taxes is a decreasing function of the households' total earnings.  
 
Grau and Lagomarsino (2002) arrived to similar conclusions, doing a more detailed 
analysis of taxation than we did. They estimated the tax payments of households in 
different deciles, considering separately three indirect taxes: IVA (value added tax), IMESI 
(sales tax) and IRP (income tax). Considering the consumption baskets and the sources of 
earnings of households in different deciles, they estimated the tax payments due by these 
households. Table 8 summarizes their main results. The aggregate of these three taxes is 
regressive, basically becasue of the value added tax (IVA).  
 
                                                 
6 For the sake of brevity, we do not report detailed results for 2001or 2002, but they are available upon 
request. We did not perform these estimations for previous years because of changes in the household survey 
that would make comparisons risky.   11 
 
However, even when indirect taxation is regressive, the pensions program that is to a 
significant extent financed with these taxes turns out to be progressive, according to our 
computations. The right panel in Table 7 presents the contribution of pensions to inequality 
computed taking into account that indirect taxes are regressive. As expected, the 
contribution of the pension program to reducing inequality is lower in this estimation than 
in the previous one, and this is so mainly because of a smaller correlation between net 
transfers of the program and total earnings. But still, the program continues being 
progressive. 
 
3.4  Some policy options 
Several parameters could be adjusted to produce a reduction in BPS expenditure on 
pensions. In this study, we considered three types of adjustments. The first is the indexation 
mechanism. While most countries use CPI or a mix of CPI and wages to adjust pensions, 
Uruguay and few other countries use wages (Table 9). In the 1989 plebiscite, the 
Constitution of the Republic established that pensions would be indexed to wages in 
Uruguay.
7 We evaluated two options: a) indexing pensions to the consumer price index 
(CPI), b) indexing pensions to a mix of CPI and wages (with equal weighs).  
 
The second adjustment evaluated was to extend the wage base period on which benefits are 
calculated. Before the reform, only the last three years of contribution-related wages were 
considered. In the 1995 reform law this was extended to the last 10 (or the best 20). We 
now evaluate an extension to the whole work history of the worker.  
 
Finally, we considered a set of scenarios in which some parameters are automatically linked 
to life expectancy. In one of these scenarios, we linked the minimum age for retirement to 
life expectancy. In a second one, we assumed that the average age of retirement adjusts 
with life expectancy. In this case, we did not specify which parameters should be changed 
to effect this voluntary change in the normal retirement age. We just wanted to answer the 
relatively simpler question about the implications that the postponement of retirement as 
life expectancy increases would have. In a third scenario, we modified the replacement 
rates with life expectancy. The main assumptions in each of these scenarios are summarized 
in Table 10.
8 In all cases, we assume that the policy changes are adopted in 2005 and hold 
from then on.  
 
The indexation of pensions to CPI would cause a reduction in BPS expenditure in the order 
of 9 million dollars during the first year (Table 11). The discounted sum of savings over the 
period 2005-2050 would be in the order of 1.4 billion dollars. The impact per year would 
                                                 
7  In fact, the indexation of pensions to wages had already been the usual practice for several years when the 
constitution was reformed, but the plebiscite raised this practice to a constitutional norm and, above all, 
established that pensions should be increased when civil servants’ wages were increased. The opportunity for 
the adjustment of pensions had been a contentious issue in the preceding years.  
8  Assumptions maintained through all the scenarios: a) annual rate of growth of real wages = 1.1%; b) annual 
real interest rate = 3.8%; c) annual rate of growth of population: approximately 0.6%, but varying according 
to CELADE's demographic projections.   12 
 
be about 30 million on average in this same period.
9 The savings stem from replacing an 
indexation formula that raises pensions with wages with a formula that keeps the 
purchasing power of pensions constant. The assumption that real wages grow during the 
simulation period is thus crucial for this result. The reduction in BPS expenditure would be 
roughly one half of those figures if the new index were a mix of CPI and wages with equal 
weighs, rather than just CPI. There are some second order effects on the resources of the 
BPS as well, for the yield of value added tax undergoes some marginal changes in this 
scenario because of changes in consumption. Low-income workers tend to lose 
proportionally more than high-income workers with the simulated changes in the 
indexation mechanism (Table 12). The estimated long run impact of changing the 
indexation mechanism is greater the smaller the discount rates and the greater the rates of 
growth of real wages. 
 
It is worth mentioning here that the significant rise in the purchasing power of pensions that 
took place during most of the last fifteen years would also have occurred if pensions had 
been indexed to CPI rather than to wages. Pensions grew in real terms in this period mostly 
due to the combination of lagged indexation and disinflation. The choice of the index had a 
second order impact on the trend of the purchasing power of pensions in this specific 
period. Be this as it may, the purchasing power of pensions was more volatile and more 
pro-cyclical with the indexation to wages than what it would have been had pensions been 
indexed to CPI (Figure 2).  
 
Extending the period considered to compute the initial pension to entire work history could 
cause a negligible reduction in expenditure in 2005 and an accumulated reduction of about 
800 million dollars, equivalent to 18 million per year, in the 2005-2050 period (Table 11). 
Pensions are reduced with this formula because wages tend to be lower at the inception of 
working life. This policy change would take several years to fully impact on reduced BPS 
spending, for pensions granted before the policy change are not affected. This policy 
reform tends to impact more on middle-income workers than on either high- or low-income 
workers (Table 12). Many high and low income workers are constrained by the minimum 
and maximum pensions, which are not affected by changes in the pension base wage. 
 
Adjusting the parameters of the pensions program with life expectancy would have almost 
no effect in the very short run, because longevity is not expected to jump in the near future. 
This was just to be expected, for reforms of this sort are not designed to effect a drastic 
immediate change in the balance of the pensions program. This type of reform is meant 
rather to provide mechanisms for automatic adjustment to demographic changes, which 
tend to be slow and take time to become fully manifest. The idea is to avoid repeating the 
situation in the past in which pension programs did not react to demographic changes.  
 
The automatic adjustments to longevity could reduce the accumulated BPS deficit over the 
2005-2050 period in the order of three to five hundreds million dollars (Table 11). 
However, raising the minimum retirement age when life expectancy rises would have 
relatively minor effects, basically because this constraint does not seem to be binding for 
                                                 
9 The impact would be significantly greater in the very long run. The steady state effect would be in the order 
of 0.45 percent of GDP.   13 
 
most workers.
10 If, in turn, the average retirement age adjusted with longevity, the BPS 
would spend almost 300 million dollars less and collect about 380 million more over the 
2005-2050 period. The increase in resources is mostly explained by higher payroll taxes, 
because of longer working life. Shifting the rate of replacement with longevity could reduce 
accumulated spending by about 550 million in the same period. The impact on the deficit is 
smaller because of a reduction in the yield of value added tax, but this second effect is of a 
much smaller magnitude, so that the next effect is a reduction in the accumulated deficit by 
about 500 million.   
 
The automatic adjustments to longevity would naturally impact more on younger 
generations, for these are the people whose life expectancy is longer (Table 12). Middle-
income workers tend to lose relatively more than low- and high-income workers with these 
policy changes (except for males of the 2000-2009 generations in the scenarios with ages of 
retirement moving with life expectancy). 
 
To sum up, changing the indexation of pensions to the consumer price index is, among the 
reforms evaluated in this study, the one with strongest impact. It is the policy reform that 
reduces the BPS expenditure the most. It is also the policy option that causes the highest 
loss among low-income female workers. These workers are among the few who are 
receiving a positive and significant lifetime net transfer from the BPS pension program. 
Reducing the benefit would therefore impact on them proportionally more than on other 
groups of workers. 
4 Unemployment  Insurance 
4.1  Description of the Program 
The main unemployment insurance program in Uruguay is managed by the Banco de 
Previsión Social (BPS), and regulated by decree-law 15.180 passed in August 1981. There 
is also a smaller separate program for bank employees, administered by the Caja de 
Jubilaciones Bancarias, created by law 17.613 passed in December 2002. This law re-
structured the banking sector after a crisis that involved the closure of several private 
banks.  
 
The BPS unemployment insurance program provides a monthly cash transfer to workers in 
the private sector who are fired from a formal job performed for an employer (self-
employment is not covered). The program does not have a separate well-identified funding 
system and it is to a large extent financed out of general taxes, but workers must have paid 
payroll taxes to social security in order to be eligible to receive unemployment benefit. 
Hence, the program excludes workers in the informal sector.
11 Also, no unemployment 
insurance program covers domestic service workers. To be eligible, the worker must have 
been separated against his or her will and not for disciplinary reasons. Workers who have 
                                                 
10  We could compute the impact of changing minimum retirement ages on mean retirement ages using 
information from a sample of work history recently released by the BPS. The sample covers 80 thousand 
workers over 1996 to July 2004. 
11 To be eligible, workers must have been legally registered in the labor office for at least six months in the 
year before the claim.   14 
 
not been dismissed but whose working time has been reduced by 25 percent or more are 
also eligible for the benefit. Separation does not have to be permanent to access the 
program: workers who are temporarily separated (or “suspended”) and continue as 
employees of the firm have the right to receive unemployment benefit. A significant share 
of the current recipients of the benefits belongs to this category (we will say more about 
this below).  
 
The ordinary BPS unemployment benefit amounts to 50 percent of the average wage during 
the last 6 months. However, the benefit cannot be lower than half the national minimum 
wage (SMN) or higher than eight times the national minimum wage.
12 The benefit paid to 
workers who suffered a reduction in working time is roughly proportional to this reduction. 
Workers who are married or support relatives receive an additional 20 percent.  
 
As a general rule, the BPS pays unemployment benefit for six months, and the worker 
cannot access the benefit again until no less than twelve months have elapsed since the 
previous period in which he or she received benefit. However, the Executive Power can 
mandate the BPS to extend the period of payment by up to twelve months. These 
extensions are selective (not universal) and by law they are left to the discretion of the 
Executive Power, with the only condition that the Executive should provide substantiated 
reasons for the extension. In several cases, Parliament has passed laws that granted the 
benefit for even longer periods for specific groups of workers (laws 16.623, 16.792, 17276, 
17288, 17293, 17325, 17346, 17553 and 17594). 
  
The unemployment insurance program for banking employees grants benefits to workers 
who have contributed to the Banking Sector Retirement Program for no less than six 
months before separation. The replacement rate is 50 percent, like in the BPS general 
program, but the maximum payment amounts to 20 (rather than 8) SMN. As a general rule, 
the benefit is paid for six months, but it can be extended up to a maximum of eighteen 
months. Unlike in the program administered by the BPS, the authorities of the Banking 
Sector Retirement Program decide the extensions. The unemployment program is financed 
with a complex mix of general taxes and payroll taxes in the banking sector.  
 
International agreements and ILO conventions have contributed to forging a common basic 
model to which most unemployment insurance programs in the world have adapted. 
Nevertheless, the agreements and conventions are flexible enough to allow for some 
important differences across countries. For example, ILO accepts that some groups of 
workers can be excluded, like the self-employed, domestic service, public employees, 
workers in seasonal activities, some age groups, temporary workers and family labor 
(Bucheli and Diez de Medina, 2002). The period for receiving benefits and the amount of 
the payment also vary considerably across countries. But probably more important than 
these differences in the norms are the differences in their implementation. For example, the 
effective coverage of the unemployment insurance program varies widely across countries, 
and the differences in norms do not seem to explain most of this variation. Different 
structural realities in labor markets and different capabilities to effectively implement the 
                                                 
12  In July 2004, the national minimum wage was approximately equal to 40 dollars per month or 13 percent 
of per capita GDP.   15 
 
norms are likely to be more important explanatory factors for the diversity in practice than 
differences in the wording of the norms. Besides, similar norms are likely to produce 
different results in different countries.  
 
4.2 Projected  Spending 
After reaching a peak in 2002, BPS expenditure on the unemployment insurance program 
fell significantly in 2003 (Table 13).
13 We expect the economic recovery to push this figure 
further down in the next few years. Assuming that GDP will recover only 7 percent in 2004 
and 3 percent from next year to 2012, we estimated that expenditure on the unemployment 
insurance program could go down to figures in the order of 0.15 to 0.17 percent of GDP by 
2012, if the program is not reformed.  
 
Economic growth would reduce the rate of unemployment and thus the number of 
applicants for benefits. Replicating the behavior of unemployment over the ten year period 
that followed the 1982 crisis and projecting it to the ten years that will follow the 2002 
crisis, we projected a rate of unemployment of about eleven percent by 2012. The number 
of recipients of unemployment benefit would then drop by about 20 to 33 percent 
(depending on the specific assumptions made, see the appendix for the details). The amount 
of the benefit is projected to grow 7 percent from 2003 to 2012.
14 Therefore, with these 
assumptions, BPS spending in real terms on this program would be between 15 and 29 
percent less in 2012 than in 2003. We are assuming that GDP will grow about 36 percent in 
this period. Combining the smaller real spending with the greater GDP, we get a ratio of 
expenditure in the unemployment insurance program to GDP that is much smaller in 2012 
than in 2003. The involved figures are relatively small however, given the small size of this 
program. According to these projections, the BPS would be spending about 0.1 points of 
GDP less in 2012 than it did in 2003. 
 
4.3 Equity  Impact 
It has been argued that unemployment insurance programs do not make a significant 
contribution to the reduction of inequality. Benefits paid are positively correlated to 
previous earnings and hence, the argument goes, high paid workers receive high 
unemployment payments. Feldstein
15, for example, found that only 17 percent of 
unemployment benefits went to families earning less than half the average income in 1970 
in the US. Also, more than 15 percent went to families earning more than twice the average 
income. Mazza (1999) makes a similar point for Argentina: “... the population served is 
typically not the lowest income levels and this is true in the Argentine case (…) only 6% of 
beneficiaries made 300 pesos/month or less (February 1998). The majority of applicants 
                                                 
13 The incipient economic recovery that began last year could explain part of this reduced spending on 
unemployment benefits, but there seems to be something else. The fall in the number of unemployed workers 
was not large enough to explain such a drastic fall in the expenditure of this program. It might also be the case 
that many unemployed workers who received benefits in 2002 lost the right to continue receiving it during 
2003. 
14 This projection is based on a regression of the benefit on a moving average of real wages and an assumed 
growth in real wages of 2 percent per year between 2004 and 2012. See the appendix for the details.  
15 Quoted by Browning and Browning (1994)   16 
 
(51%) are in the range 300 – 600 pesos per month, but surprisingly 17% of recipients had 
salaries in excess of 1000 pesos a month, more than three times the maximum benefit level 
they receive from unemployment insurance”(...).“Fewer and fewer low-income people 
benefit from the program ... in 1992 11% of recipients had previous incomes of the 
minimum wage or below. By 1997, this percentage has been cut in half, with only 5.9% at 
this income level. Nearly 12% earn more than five times the minimum wage”.  
 
On top of that, some analysts argue that unemployment insurance programs fail as social 
protection devices in countries in which labor markets are to a large extent informal. For 
example, Islas (2002) observes that the poorest workers do not access benefits because they 
do not fulfill the requirements. Furthermore, he claims that an unemployment insurance 
program with strong government financing would make income distribution more unequal, 
and would have low impact on the poorest workers. Heckman and Pagés (2000) make a 
similar point for job security provisions in general.
16 
 
It has also been argued that contributory unemployment insurance programs are not 
designed to perform redistribution but to provide insurance. Velásquez (2003a) observes 
that developed countries combine contributory unemployment insurance programs with 
assistance programs. The former redistribute earnings over time, from periods in which the 
worker is employed to periods in which the worker is unemployed, and they serve 
insurance rather than a redistribute purpose. It is the task of the assistance programs to 
perform redistribution.  
 
In order to empirically assess the impact of unemployment insurance and other government 
transfer programs on inequality, we computed the inequality decomposition indexes 
proposed by Shorrocks (1982). Using data from the household survey, we were able to 
calculate the contribution of government transfer programs to total inequality, treating these 
programs as separate sources of income. The survey provides direct data on benefits 
received by different individuals from government programs, but it does not provide 
information on contributions paid by individuals to finance the programs. If the programs 
are assessed according to benefits alone, i.e. without explicitly taking contributions into 
account, the results obtained are very much in line with the results quoted above: 
unemployment insurance programs increase inequality because richer households receive 
higher benefits. But this assessment looks incomplete, for the effect of the program on 
income distribution depends not only on benefits received but also on taxes paid to finance 
the program. If richer families received higher benefits but paid much higher contributions, 
the programs could still contribute to reduce inequality. Therefore we evaluated the 
programs considering net rather than gross transfers (see the appendix for the details).  
 
                                                 
16 “Our evidence suggests that job security provisions are an extremely inefficient and inequality-increasing 
mechanism for providing income security for workers. They are inefficient because they reduce the demand 
for labor; they are inequality-increasing because some workers benefit while many others are hurt. Their 
impact on inequality is multi-faceted: job security increases inequality because it reduces the employment 
prospects of young, female and unskilled workers. It also increases inequality because it segregates the labor 
market between workers with secure jobs and those with very little prospect of becoming employed. Finally, 
job security provisions increase inequality if, as predicted by some theoretical studies and most of the 
available empirical evidence, they increase the size of the informal sector” (Heckman and Pagés, 2000).   17 
 
According to the results summarized in Table 7, unemployment insurance programs made a 
small contribution to the reduction of inequality in Uruguay in 2003.
17 These programs 
contributed with no more than – 0.26 percent to total inequality.
18 The programs reduced 
inequality, because net transfers received by households through this program tended to be 
negatively correlated to total income. In other words, benefits received net of direct and 
indirect contributions paid to finance the program were larger for poor than for rich 
households. However, this program has made a modest contribution to the reduction of 
inequality, and this was mostly because the program is small. The standard deviation of the 
net transfers of the unemployment programs amounted for only 1.3 percent of the standard 
deviation of total income. 
  
These computations are only rough approximations to the contribution of the 
unemployment insurance programs to inequality. First, there is a data problem. The social 
security institutions do not provide micro data on these programs, and the household survey 
does not seem to fully capture the benefits paid by the social security institutions. The 
number of recipients of unemployment benefit estimated from the household survey 
represents only two thirds of what the social security institutions report, and the benefits 
reported by respondents to the household survey represent about sixty percent of what the 
BPS reports. A second problem derives from the lack of direct data about taxes paid to 
finance the program. We had to make some simple assumptions to distribute the burden of 
financing the program across households. This notwithstanding, the qualitative results 
looked robust to sensitivity analysis (see the appendix). A third point the reader should be 
aware of is that these are only accounting estimations. There is no economic model behind 
these computations. The government transfer programs are likely to induce changes in 
private agent behavior, and these changes might alter income distribution. If, for example, 
workers receiving unemployment benefit made less of an effort to search for jobs, the net 
effect of the benefit on the workers’ earnings would be lower than what our computations 
suggest. But estimating these indirect effects is not easy, and it seems doubtful that they 
could be of a magnitude to significantly change the qualitative results.    
 
4.4  Some Weaknesses of the Current Program 
Several problems have been identified in the current unemployment insurance program: (i) 
low coverage, (ii) bad focus, (iii) extensions of the period of benefits are discretionary (iv) 
insufficient coordination with other programs, (v) incentive distortions.  
 
(i) Low coverage. The Uruguayan unemployment insurance programs cover a small 
fraction of unemployed workers. According to the household surveys, in the last decade, 
recipients of unemployment benefit who were actually unemployed never reached seven 
percent of total unemployed workers (column 2 in Table 16). But there is also a significant 
number of recipients of benefits who were not registered as being unemployed (see column 
                                                 
17 For the sake of brevity, we present these computations only for 2003, but we obtained similar results for 
2001 and 2002. These results are available from the authors upon request. We did not compute these indexes 
for other years because of the changes in the methodology of the household survey in 2001. 
18 This contribution reduces to – 0.13 if the indirect taxes are assumed to be proportional to household 
expenditure rather to income. See the appendix for the details.   18 
 
3). This peculiar situation seems to be mostly explained by the so called "causal 
suspension", i.e. the fact that workers in activities that are temporarily suspended are 
eligible for benefit even if these workers are not computed as unemployed in the official 
statistics (see more on this below). Yet, even after adding these recipients who are 
employed, the total figures from the household surveys are well below the administrative 
records of the social security institutions (columns 4 and 5). This gap suggests that the 
surveys underestimate the number of recipients, and hence actual coverage is likely to be 
larger than what the figures in column 2 show. This notwithstanding, the total number of 
recipients of benefits, according to the social security institutions, is still small compared to 
the number of unemployed workers. Even if all these unemployment benefit payments had 
been granted to workers who were actually unemployed, the program would have never 
covered more than 18 percent of unemployed workers (column 6).  
 
The low coverage of the unemployment insurance program seems to be a hard fact 
stemming from the structure of the Uruguayan labor market and the design of the program. 
Table 17 shows that more than 85 percent of unemployed workers in 2002 could not access 
unemployment benefit, according to their answers to the household survey, because they 
would not meet the requirements: (i) 17 percent were searching for a job for the first time, 
(ii) more than 35 percent had not contributed to social security in their previous job, (iii) 31 
percent had not been working for more than one year and (iv) about 2 percent were workers 
in the public sector or self employed. Of the remaining 14.5 percent of unemployed people, 
only 6.2 were receiving benefits. Another 8.3 percent of unemployed workers did not 
receive benefits despite having had no job for less than a year, having performed as 
dependent workers in a private job and paying social security contributions. Many of these 
workers may still not be eligible and there are several reasons for this, like having already 
received 6 months of benefits, having been dismissed for disciplinary reasons or not having 
been dismissed. In any case, it seems interesting to notice that this group involves 15.7 
thousands workers, whereas the unemployment insurance program was paying benefits to 
10.5 employed workers in the same year (the "causal suspensión").
19 
   
The coverage of the unemployment insurance program can be analyzed from the 
perspective of employed workers as well. Obviously, employed workers are not currently 
suffering unemployment, but some of them are protected by the program, i.e. they would 
receive benefits in the event of becoming involuntary unemployed. Table 18 shows that the 
program covered at most 27 percent of employed workers in 2002 (the "Others" row). The 
program did not cover (i) workers in the public sector (16.1 percent of total employment), 
(ii) self-employed and domestic service workers (11.5 percent), (iii) employees in the 
banking system (0.9 percent), or workers who were not contributing to social security (44.6 
percent). In 2003, a new unemployment insurance program began to cover employees in 
the banking system. This is not a large sector, so this innovation did not change the 
coverage of the Uruguayan unemployment insurance programs significantly.   
                                                 
19 The qualitative results remain valid for other years. In 2003, for example, at least 89 percent of the 
unemployed workers were not eligible to receive unemployment benefits, according to their answers to the 
household survey. First time job seekers and workers who lost their last job more than a year before rose as a 
share of total unemployed workers in 2003 with respect to 2002, which explains the rise in the proportion of 
unemployed workers who could not be covered by the program (and despite the reduction in the proportion of 
informal workers).    19 
 
 
The previous analysis suggests that the informality of the labor markets (in the sense of the 
lack of contributions to social security) and the prevalence of workers who have lost or 
quitted their job more than a year ago have been two key determinants in the low coverage 
of the unemployment insurance programs in Uruguay.  
 
Nevertheless, the coverage of the Uruguayan unemployment insurance program is not low 
by international standards. Even though comparing these figures across countries is a 
delicate matter, the data we have suggest that the low coverage problem is even more 
severe in other Latin American countries (Table 19). Furthermore, in Uruguay the ratio of 
recipients of  contributory unemployment insurance benefits to total number of unemployed 
workers is similar to the OECD countries (Table 20). The difference lies in the assistance 
programs: unemployed workers receive support from other non-contributory programs in 
the OECD countries, while there is nothing comparable in Uruguay.  
 
(ii) Focus. There is some evidence that the BPS unemployment insurance program has been 
extensively used to finance seasonal activities. The program grants benefits to workers that 
(a) have been dismissed, (b) work in activities that have been temporarily “suspended”, or 
(c) have suffered reductions in working time. Workers stop working while the activities are 
“suspended”, but they are still listed as employees of the firm, and they are not counted as 
unemployed. Roughly half of the workers receiving the unemployment insurance benefit 
are not unemployed, according to the household survey (Table 16). The BPS does not 
report the total number of recipients discriminated according to the reason given for 
applying to the program, but it does provide the number of new recipients discriminated in 
these categories. More than half the new recipients claimed under “suspension” of the 
activities (Table 21). There is also anecdotal evidence that some sectors with pronounced 
fluctuations in their activity from season to season systematically use the unemployment 
insurance program.  
 
The unemployment insurance program is supposed to protect workers against the risk of 
losing their jobs. It is not meant to provide income to support workers in the off season. 
Employees and employers should in theory look for other instruments to smooth out 
earnings across the seasons. If the unemployment insurance program is used in this way, 
then it will end up subsidizing seasonal activities.  
 
The program also fails to reach the target population if recipients of benefits work and do 
not report it. The information in Table 16 suggests that this problem could be sizeable in 
Uruguay. Also, according to Velásquez (2003b), the fact that more than fifty percent of 
recipients do not drop the program until the right to receive benefits has expired suggests 
abuse (see Table 14).  
 
Coverage is higher among heads of households, older workers and males than among other 
members of households, young workers and females, which suggests that the program has 
been focused on family members who provide the main support for their families (Table 
15). However, even among these groups, the coverage is still very low: only 14 percent of 
unemployed heads of household were receiving the subsidy in 2002. Other aspects of the 
focus of the program could be more worrisome: the South of the country is better covered   20 
 
than the North, and middle and high income workers are better covered than low income 
workers. 
 
(iii) Discretionary extensions. The law gives the Executive the power to extend the period 
in which specific groups of workers can receive unemployment benefits by up to twelve 
months (which doubles the original period). There are no specific rules, though, the law 
only says that the extensions must be grounded in "reasons of the public interest". 
 
Parliament has also passed several laws that extended the unemployment benefit period for 
some workers beyond the twelve-months extensions granted by the Executive. In some 
cases, the extension included in these laws reached twelve additional months, meaning that 
the total period of benefit payments was thirty months for the workers in question (the 
original six plus the twelve-month extension granted by the Executive, plus the twelve-
month extension in the law), i.e. five times the period in the general regime. There are cases 
in which the extension period was left open.
20  
 
Analysts and political actors have expressed concern about the extension of the benefit 
period (Trylesinsky 2001; Velásquez 2003b; EPFA, 1999; PN, 2004a). Velásquez (2003b) 
cites Trylesinsky (2001) who estimates that about thirty percent of recipients and fifteen 
percent of total expenditure in the program can be explained by these extensions. Velásquez 
argues that this is too much for an instrument that was included in the initial law to cater to 
exceptional situations. The lack of clear guidelines about extensions is an additional cause 
for concern since this leaves an open window for lobbying. More than one proposal to 
reform the program addresses these concerns. 
 
(iv) Coordination. Several observers argue that Uruguayan unemployment insurance 
program, like others in Latin America, has not been properly coordinated with other 
programs and instruments. In Argentina, Islas (2002) criticizes the lack of coordination 
between unemployment insurance and training programs, and Mazza (1999) points out that 
workers in the unemployment program do not receive help to facilitate their search for a 
new job. Bertranou (2001) makes a similar point for the region in general. Velásquez 
(2002b) also emphasizes that the unemployment program must not only provide earnings 
replacement but also give help with finding a new job. Political parties have also expressed 
this type of concern in Uruguay. For example, the Partido Nacional proposed subsidizing 
the hiring of workers on the unemployment insurance program.  
 
Special concern has been expressed about the lack of coordination of unemployment 
insurance and severance payments in some Latin-American countries. Mazza (1999) asserts 
“severance and other termination benefits may be so substantial in some countries as to 
dwarf, and make irrelevant, any unemployment insurance program”. Bertranou (2001) 
advocates an expansion of the unemployment insurance programs at the expense of 
severance payments. He argues that while both serve the purpose of replacing lost earnings, 
severance payments are a disincentive to hiring to a greater extent than unemployment 
insurance. Bertranou also emphasizes the anti-cyclical pattern of unemployment insurance 
                                                 
20 See laws 16792, 16623, 17276, 17288, 17293, 17325, 17346, 17553 and 17594 
(http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/). In the first four, the extension period was left unspecified.   21 
 
expenditure. Without saying whether one causes more distortion than the other, Velásquez 
(2003a) mentions that the overlapping of these two instruments represents a "double cost" 
for the employer, and this may negatively affect hiring and the duration of labor contracts. 
Nevertheless, he warns that unemployment insurance programs cannot fully replace 
severance payments, for these programs have different characteristics. Unemployment 
insurance provides protection against temporary reductions in employment and hence the 
benefits are limited to a period that is usually related to the average duration of 
unemployment. Severance payments try to protect workers from being dismissed for 
temporary reasons, and hence the payment rises with the seniority of the worker. In spite of 
this, it is doubtful whether severance payments seriously interfere with unemployment 
insurance in Uruguay, given that these payments are relatively low in the country, at least 
by Latin-American standards, according to Heckman and Pagés (2000). 
 
(v) Moral Hazard. The classic warning against unemployment insurance programs is that 
they reduce the incentives workers have to actively search for work and accept job 
opportunities (Browning and Browning, 1994; among others). These concerns have not 
been so prominent in Latin America because of the low coverage and low replacement rates 
of the systems in the region. Nevertheless, the point should be considered in the event of 
reformulations of the programs that involve higher coverage.  
 
A related form of abuse of the system is people accepting a job only so that they may enjoy 
unemployment benefits later on. This opportunistic behavior is usually controlled through 
requirements of a long enough period of contributions prior to access to benefits. It is worth 
noting that the period of contributions required to access unemployment benefit is 
comparatively short in Uruguay. Velásquez (2003b) also argues that the current required 
period of contributions looks insufficient in the light of some institutional weaknesses that 
affect the monitoring capacity of the administration in terms of both previous required 
contributions and the lack of job opportunities during the period the worker is receiving the 
benefit.  
 
It has also been argued that workers could force dismissal just to get the subsidy. However, 
this risk seems to be controlled with the condition that workers who are dismissed for 
disciplinary reasons are not eligible for the unemployment benefit.  
 
4.5  Options for Reform 
4.5.1  Some current reform projects 
 
There are several proposals to reform the BPS unemployment insurance program from the 
government, the political parties, the trade unions and a consultant from the ILO 
(Velásquez, 2003b).
21 None of these proposals are a complete and fully articulated bill, but 
they address some of the issues raised above. In order to summarize the information and 
facilitate comparisons, we have organized these proposals in a table with rows representing 
the main parameters of the program and columns for the different proposals (Table 22). The 
                                                 
21 The project from the Executive Power is not directly available. We have only been able to learn about it 
through Velásquez (2003b).    22 
 
first column summarizes the current program, and the others register the changes to the 
current program proposed in each project. Needless to say, this tabulated presentation is by 
its very nature sketchy and does not fully capture the richness of the proposals.  
 
There have been several proposals to change the eligibility conditions to make them more 
demanding than the current ones in some cases, and less demanding in other cases. The 
latter proposals, from the left wing parties and the central trade union, aim at broadening 
coverage to incorporate groups of the population that are not currently legally covered 
(domestic service) and to reduce the requirements for access to benefits. It has also been 
argued that the former, that is to say the proposals to tighten the conditions for access to 
benefits, will serve the purpose of raising coverage, but through improving the focus of the 
program to cater to workers who really are unemployed, and in some cases to supplement 
the unemployment insurance program with assistance programs. Both the Executive Power 
and Velásquez (2003b) propose extending the period of contributions required to become 
eligible. They also make proposals that could limit and even eliminate the "causal 
suspension " as a reason to access unemployment benefit. The Executive Power proposes 
that employers contribute to financing the benefits with a month’s salary when the claim is 
based on "suspension of  activities". Velásquez (2003b) proposes eliminating this reason 
for accessing unemployment benefits.  
 
Some of the reform packages propose changing the ordinary period for receiving benefits. 
The Minister of Labor proposed extending this period to nine months, but without changing 
the total amount paid (El Observador, 2004). The Executive Power’s project is to link the 
period for receiving benefits to the "credit" the worker has in his unemployment "account". 
Velásquez (2003b) proposes keeping the current six-month system. 
 
There have also been proposals to limit the discretion that the Executive Power currently 
has to extend the periods of benefit payments. The Partido Nacional (the Alianza Nacional 
faction) proposes reducing the extensions to six rather than the current twelve months, and 
specifying the conditions that firms should meet to be eligible for this extension. The 
central trade union proposes that the BPS, rather than the Executive Power, be allowed to 
extend the period for up to twelve months, and again under some pre-specified conditions. 
Velásquez (2003b) proposes eliminating discretionary extensions of the period of 
unemployment benefit payments altogether. He suggests that the authorities have often 
been pushed to extend the period of unemployment benefit payments for some groups of 
workers because of the lack of other options to deal with problems of persistent poverty. 
Velásquez proposes means-testing and non-contributory programs to meet these needs.  
 
The central trade union proposes raising the amount of the benefits paid. Both the Minister 
of Labor and Velásquez (2003b) propose a system whereby the payment is reduced over 
time without changing the current average. Velásquez also proposes having the minimum 
and maximum benefits indexed to the private sector average wage rather than to the SMN, 
and computing the benefit using twelve rather than six months, to discourage abuse.  
 
As to the financing, the Minister of Labor proposes that firms should contribute in 
according with the use they make of the program. Others have expressed concern on this 
question, but no specific proposals could be drawn from the documents.   23 
 
4.5.2  Quantifying the proposals 
 
It is not easy to estimate how much the government would spend on the unemployment 
insurance program under the reform proposals described. Some proposals lend themselves 
better to this type of exercise than others, so the estimations are inevitably partial. We 
chose not to estimate some of them just because of the difficulties involved in doing so. In 
this section we aim to provide some rough numbers to at least give the orders of magnitude 
involved in some of these proposals. 
  
Velásquez (2003b) already provides some estimation of the costs/savings of his proposals. 
He computes the "implicit contribution rate" to finance the program, i.e. the rate of the 
payroll tax that recipients of unemployment benefit would have to pay if they fully financed 
the program with the contributions required to be eligible. The current implicit rate is 
estimated to be 3.6 percent. Velásquez estimates that his proposal to extend the period of 
contributions to be eligible would reduce this number to 2.7 percent. It should be 
mentioned, however, that the reduction in this rate is just the result of dividing the same 
burden over a longer period of contributions, and hence there is no real savings here. 
Velásquez estimates that the elimination of the extensions of the period for receiving 
benefits would mean an additional reduction in the implicit contribution rate to 2.3 percent. 
This is a real saving derived from a cut in a benefit. The elimination of the "causal 
suspensión" to access benefits causes no reduction in expenditure because the author 
assumes that the savings that would arise are exactly counterbalanced by the expansion of 
the non-contributory programs proposed to cater to the long term poverty problems. 
Finally, Velásquez estimates that having benefits that decrease over the period reduces the 
implicit contribution rate to 1.9 percent.  
 
In order to assess the "causal suspensión", we estimated the direct impact on public 
expenditure of reducing the number of recipients of benefits on these grounds by fifty and 
by a hundred percent. In the first scenario, the expenditure is reduced from the current 0.54 
percent to 0.41 percent of GDP (2002 figures). In the second scenario, which means the 
elimination of the "causal suspensión", the expenditure in the unemployment insurance 
program is reduced to 0.28 percent of GDP. Other proposals to tighten eligibility conditions 
are likely to lead to some additional savings, but we cannot tell to what extent that will be 
so. 
 
The proposals made by the PIT-CNT union are expansionary. We estimate that public 
spending on the unemployment insurance program would rise from the current 0.54 to 
about 0.75 percent of GDP if these proposals were implemented (again, 2002 figures). This 
increase would result from a double effect. There is, first, a rise in the number of recipients 
of benefits because of the extension of legal coverage to domestic service. If all domestic 
servants with less than one year of unemployment received the subsidy, the number of 
recipients would rise by 16 percent.
22 Second, the unions propose to raise the subsidy per 
capita by approximately 20 percent. The accumulated effect is the 39 percent rise in the 
estimated expenditure in the program.  
                                                 
22 The number of recipients would rise by 12 percent if the expansion were proportional to the rise in the 
number of employed workers who are legally covered.   24 
 
 
It is worth noting that none of the evaluated proposals to reform the unemployment 
insurance program would significantly modify the currently low coverage of the program.  
5  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we revised the working and perspectives of the main contributory social 
security programs in Uruguay. Pensions are by far the largest government program, 
representing roughly one half of total government spending. We briefly summarized the 
existing projections of the balance of the BPS, the main social security institution of the 
country, and concluded that the dominant view is that its expenditure and deficit will very 
gradually decrease over the next few years. Nevertheless, expectations of future 
improvement in the balance of the BPS rest to a large extent on indirect estimations of the 
amounts of benefit granted on irregular basis in the past. There seems to be little doubt that 
these practices are disappearing, but it is still difficult to estimate the fiscal impact of this 
change. Also, the recent recession obscures the monitoring of the performance of the 
reformed pensions program. Recent performance has been worse than expected, and this 
seems mostly due to the severe recession that Uruguay has suffered. As such, it might be a 
temporary phenomenon, but these results could also partially respond to the program being 
on a different track than what was expected. On top of that, the crisis has left the 
government in a delicate situation, with gross public debt now amounting to about 110 
percent of annual GDP. Besides this, the social situation deteriorated dramatically during 
the crisis and it seems likely that the government will feel the need to implement new social 
programs or expand some of the existing ones, so the pressure on public spending will 
continue to be high. Therefore we evaluated the fiscal and equity impact of some policy 
options that have been considered in other countries to reduce spending on pensions.  
 
Before moving on to the policy options, we estimated the equity impact of the current 
pensions programs.
23 The main conclusion is that pensions are currently contributing to 
reducing income inequality. Even though richer households receive higher pensions, they 
also make higher contributions to finance the program. According to our estimations, the 
latter outweighs the former.  
 
We considered three sets of pension policy options that have to do with: (i) indexation 
mechanisms, (ii) period of contributions considered to compute the initial pension, and (iii) 
longevity adjusted parameters. Uruguayan pensions are currently indexed to wages. We 
estimate that replacing the consumption price index for wages would cause a reduction in 
public spending in the order of only 9 million dollars in the first year and an accumulated 
reduction of about 1.4 billion dollars over the following 45 years (2005-2050 period).
24  
 
The other pension policy options evaluated in this study have smaller expected fiscal 
impact. The short term effects are very small. Changing the initial pension, either through 
the "pensions base wage" or the rate of replacement, would have a small immediate impact 
                                                 
23 The data did not allow us to distinguish different pension programs and thus these results are about the 
aggregate. 
24  All these figures are measured in 2003 dollars.   25 
 
because the BPS would continue for several years to serve mostly pensions computed under 
the current rules. It is only when "old" pensions are replaces by "new" pensions that this 
type of policy change has an effect.  
 
Nevertheless, according to our estimations, even in the long run these policy reforms would 
impact on the BPS budget to a smaller extent than the change in the indexation rules. 
Changing the minimum age for retirement in accordance with to the evolution of longevity 
would be the least effective among the evaluated policies. Two factors explain our result. 
First, minimum ages do not currently seem to be binding constraints for most workers, for 
they retire at higher ages.
25 Second, the changes in longevity are long term phenomena that 
take place very gradually. If the increase in life expectancy impacted one to one on the 
average (rather than on the minimum
26) retirement age, the impact on the deficit of the BPS 
accumulated over 2005-2050 would be in the order of 660 million dollars. Shifting the rates 
of replacement as life expectancy rises could cause a reduction in the accumulated deficit in 
the order of 500 million dollars over the same period. This impact is not very impressive, 
but it should be mentioned that according to our simulations the BPS might be spending 
about 0.4 percent of GDP less in these two scenarios by 2050. The impact from then on 
would thus be significantly greater than in the period of our current simulation. Extending 
the period that we considered to compute the base wage to the whole work history period 
might reduce expenditure by about 800 million dollars accumulated in the 2005-2050 
period.  
 
The equity impact of these policy changes looks moderate and no simple pattern emerges. 
Changing the indexation mechanism would impact more on low than on high-income 
workers. Extending the period to compute the initial pension to the entire work history 
would impact more on middle-income workers than on either low- or high-income workers. 
The patterns however are not neat and we think that these results might be too sensitive to 
some assumptions and even to the structure of the simulation model. Further research is 
needed to come to robust conclusions on this front. 
 
The main problem often mentioned in the Uruguayan unemployment insurance program is 
its limited coverage. Furthermore, the analysis suggested that it would not be easy to 
protect the majority of workers against the risk of suffering unemployment, given the 
structural problems of Uruguayan labor markets. Changing the design of the existing 
contributory programs could help in the margin, but it will hardly solve the main problems, 
which are mostly related to informality (evasion of contributions), workers lacking 
employment for long periods, and unemployment of individuals searching for a job for the 
first time. International comparisons reinforce this view. Countries that have been more 
successful in protecting their population against the unemployment are mostly developed 
countries in which informality is much less prevalent. Even in these countries, high 
coverage has been accomplished combining the contributory unemployment programs with 
other assistance or non-contributory programs.  
                                                 
25 This observation is based on a preliminary analysis of a data base of work history recently released by BPS.  
26 Average retirement age is not a variable the government or the BPS can directly control. In this sense, this 
is not strictly a simulation of a policy option. Nevertheless, this exercise may be useful to evaluate to what 
extent policy options designed to induce later retirement impact on fiscal accounts.    26 
 
 
A careful revision of the existing "causal suspension" to grant the subsidy seems in order. 
In Uruguay, about half of current recipients of unemployment benefit are not "technically" 
unemployed, which seems a contradiction in terms. Furthermore, this is not because they 
work in the informal economy, but because firms are legally allowed to "suspend" an 
activity and send workers to claim unemployment benefits. The workers remain with the 
firm, but they are temporarily out of work and receive payments only from the 
unemployment insurance program (in theory). There is ample evidence that this mechanism 
is working as a subsidy for seasonal activities. Re-directing these funds towards the 
genuinely unemployed would not fully solve the problems of low coverage that we have, 
but it would be enough, for example, to finance the extension of legal coverage to domestic 
service. 
 
According to our computations, the unemployment insurance program makes a small 
contribution to the reduction of inequality in Uruguay. Benefits received net of   
contributions paid to finance the program tend to be greater in low than in high-income 
households, and hence the program reduces inequality. Nevertheless, the impact is small 
mostly because of the small size of the program. 
6 Methodological  Appendix 
6.1  The contribution of transfer programs to inequality 
We assess the contribution of transfer programs to inequality using the decomposition of 
inequality indexes in terms of sources of income proposed by Shorrocks (1982a). We treat 
each transfers program as a specific sources of income computed as the transfer received by 
each individual net of the direct and indirect payments that individuals make to finance the 
programs. Because of the lack of micro-data on direct and indirect contributions, we had to 
make some assumptions to compute net transfers. This appendix describes these 
assumptions and the computation procedure in detail. 
 
Let  ij y be the earnings of individual j from sources i, and  j I y be the net transfer the 
government program pays to or collects from j. Since row I of the matrix of earnings 
registers both benefits received from and contributions and taxes paid to finance the 
program, the earnings registered in other rows must be measured before taxes paid to 
finance the transfers program.  
 
For the transfer program to be complete, the records on row I of the earnings matrix must 
sum zero: someone else must pay for benefits received by an individual. Formally,  
 
0 = ∑ j Ij y  
(1) 
The contribution of the transfer program to inequality can be computed regressing the net 
transfers in row I on total income. The slope of the regressions of the sources of income (or   27 
 
income factors) on total income is the proportional contribution of the income factor to 
inequality (Shorrocks, 1982a and b).  
 
We used micro-data from the household survey and some aggregated data from 
administrative records of social security programs to build the matrix with elements  ij y . 
The household survey provides individual data on several sources of income, including 
benefits paid by some social protection programs, but it does not provide information on 
contributions and taxes paid to finance the program. We know from the social security 
institutions that these programs are financed with a complex mix of payroll and general 
taxes. Among the latter, indirect taxes are by far the biggest factor, with value added tax 
accounting for a significant share of the whole package. We distinguish thus payroll taxes 
ij a  and indirect taxes  ij t .  
 
Labor earnings in the household survey are reported after payroll taxes  ( ) ' ij y . Hence, we 
added payroll taxes to get pre-tax labor earnings: 
 
I i a y y ij ij ij ≠ + = ; ' 
(2) 
Naturally,  ij a must be zero if the source of income i is non-labor income. Given that other 
social security revenues are mostly indirect taxes, we did not need to add other taxes to the 
survey’s reported earnings to get pre-tax earnings. Hence, indirect taxes satisfy the 
following condition: 
 
0 ; 0 ≥ = ≠ ∀ = j Ij ij t t I i t  
(3) 
The transfer program row was computed as: 
 
j j j Ij a t b y − − =   
(4) 
where bj stands for the benefit received by individual j from the transfer program and aj 
stands for total payroll taxes paid by individual j ( ) ∑ =
i ij j a a . 
 
Equations (2) and (4) determine the matrix of earnings organized to assess the contribution 
of the transfer program to inequality, but we do not have direct data on some of the 
variables involved. The household survey does provide the after payroll tax earnings ( ) ' ij y  
and the benefits paid by the transfer programs (bj), but it does not provide direct data on 
payroll taxes ( ) ij a  and indirect taxes paid to finance the transfer programs ( ) j t . We know 
from (1), that total taxes paid to finance the program must be equal to total benefits paid by 
the program, but we need information on individual contributions. The institutions of social 
security provide aggregate information on their sources of financing which can be used to 
determine the shares of payroll and indirect taxes in funding the programs we are   28 
 
evaluating. Let A
SS be the share of total spending of the social security programs financed 
with payroll taxes. Then, estimated individual payroll taxes and indirect taxes should satisfy 
the following conditions: 
 
( )∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ − = =
j j
SS
j j j j
SS
j j b A t b A a 1 ; 
(5) 
In order to “distribute” these aggregates among individuals, we assumed that (i) payroll 
taxes are proportional to labor income, provided the individual does contribute to social 
security, and (ii) indirect taxes are proportional to total income. More specifically, we made 
the following assumptions: 
 




⎧ ∈ ∈ >
=
otherwise








where LI stands for the subset of labor sources of income and FJ stands for formal workers, 
i.e. those individuals who declared to the household survey that they pay payroll taxes. 
Notice that the rate of payroll taxes a is a weighted average of the rates paid by different 
categories of workers, in accordance with their answers to the household survey. Also 
notice that this rate multiplies post-tax labor income, which is not the ordinary way of 
presenting the rates of payroll taxes in social security legislation.
27  
 
(A2) Indirect taxes: 
 
∑ =
i ij j y t t ' 
(6) 
We are assuming here that individuals pay indirect taxes in proportion t of their total 
earnings. This assumption is of course a rough approximation. If richer households saved 
more and thus paid proportionally less of their income in the form of value added tax, the 
proportionality assumption would be flawed. In this case, it would be more appropriate to 
assume that households pay taxes in proportion to their expenditure, and that household 
expenditure is a non-linear function of their earnings.
28 The household survey does not 
provide information to estimate this function, but we could test this hypothesis using 
information from the expenditure survey. The alternative expression is thus: 
 
( )
1 ' * * * 0
β β ∑ = =
i ij j j y t ex t t  
                                                 
27 We chose this notation to avoid the distinction between employee and employer contributions, a distinction 
we are not interested in. Total payroll tax rates on post-tax labor income can be computed using ordinary legal 
tax rates such as: (employer rate + employee rate)/(1-employee rate). The tax rate a is a weighted average of 
these transformed tax rates. 
28  We thank José Cuesta for this remark.   29 
 
(7) 
where exj stands for total expenditure of family j. Obviously, equation (6) is just a particular 
case of (7).  
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Using these tax rates and assumptions (A1) and (A2), we computed individual tax 
payments  aij and tj. We then computed individual earnings yij using these estimated 
individual tax payments in equations (2) and (4). 
 
In order to implement the option that makes use of equation (7), we regressed household 
expenditure on earnings, using micro-data from the expenditure survey conducted by the 




 Coefficient  Standard  Error  t  t P >  
() 0 ln β   1.558722 0.0558687  27.90  0.000 
1 β   0.8231034 0.0075899 108.45  0.000 
 
Number of obs =    3746 
F(  1,  3744) =11760.84 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.7585 
Adj R-squared =  0.7585 
 
We report the estimated decomposition of inequality in Table 7. The left panel was 
computed assuming that indirect taxes are proportional to income (equation (6)), and the 
right panel was computed assuming that indirect taxes are proportional to expenditure 
(equation (7)). The results are similar, even though the government transfer programs look 
less redistributive in the second option, as should be expected. 
  
The role of taxes 
 
It is worth mentioning that, according to our results, it is the combined effect of benefits 
and taxes what makes government transfer programs reduce inequality. If we assess the 
programs looking only at the benefits they grant, we find that pensions and unemployment 
insurance raise inequality, which is the most common result in the literature. It is thus the 
inclusion of taxes in the analysis what renders these programs progressive.  
   30 
 
To illustrate this point, consider the following representation of total earnings and pensions 
across households (Figure 3). It turns out that households with higher per capita earnings 
tend to have higher per capita pensions as well, so the slope of the regression line is 
positive. Hence, Shorrocks' measure of the contribution of pensions to inequality is positive 
in this case, and it makes intuitive sense, because richer households receive higher 
pensions. 
 
Consider now taxes paid to finance the pensions program. If households with high total 
earnings pay more taxes than households with low earnings, then the net transfer will have 
a lower correlation with total earnings than the gross transfer. Furthermore, net transfers 
would be negatively correlated to total earnings if, as earnings rise, taxes paid increased 
more than benefits received. In this case, the program assessed with net rather than gross 
transfers would look progressive rather than regressive. This is exactly the case represented 
in Figure 4 and it is also the case of our computations with the Uruguayan data. 
 
Our results may seem to contradict the generally accepted hypothesis that taxes are 
regressive in Uruguay (Lagomarsino and Grau-Pérez, 2002), but there is in fact no 
contradiction. What Lagomarsino and Grau-Pérez claim is that rich households pay a lower 
share of their earnings as taxes than poor households, and this is exactly the case we 
assumed in Figure 4.  
 
According to these results, assessing the impact of government programs on inequality 
looking only at one side of the balance (either expenditure or taxes) could be completely 
misleading. We showed a real world case in which both expenditures and taxes "look" 
regressive when analyzed separately, and yet it turns out that the program reduces 
inequality. 
   
6.2 Projecting the Expenditure of the Unemployment Insurance 
Program 
  
Total expenditure in the unemployment insurance program (Gt) can be decomposed into the 
number of recipients ( t N ) times the individual benefit ( t B ):  t t t B N G × =    
 
1) Projecting the number of recipients 
 
We assumed a recovery in economic activity in the next few years, to project the evolution 
of the number of unemployed workers and the number of recipients of benefits. We 
specifically assumed that GDP will grow 7% during 2004 and 3% from 2005 to 2012. In 
the decade after the 1982 crisis, the rate of unemployment dropped by about 0.6 percentage 
points per year while GDP was growing by about 3% per year. Assuming a similar 
relationship between unemployment and GDP growth in this cycle, we got an expected 
decline of the rate of unemployment of 1.3 percentage points in 2004 and 0.6 percentage 
points per year from 2005 to 2012. We then projected the number of unemployed workers 
(Ut) multiplying the estimated rates of unemployment times the forecasts of the 
economically active population issued by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). Finally,   31 
 
to project the number of recipients of benefits (Nt), we regressed  () t N ln  on  () t U ln  both in 
levels and in first differences, using annual data for the period 1993-2002. The estimated 
elasticity of recipients to unemployed workers was 1.1 and 0.6, with the regressions in 
levels and in first differences respectively. Needless to say, these estimations are at most 
indicative given the number of observations available, and we decided to present both to 
give an idea of the sensitivity of these projections.  
 
2) Projecting the benefit. 
 
The unemployment subsidy is a function of the wages paid to recipients of the benefit in 
















B β β    
where  w= real salary, and  = t B  unemployment benefot. We estimated this equation using 
annual data for the period 1993-2002, getting  = 2 β  0.8,  = 3 β 0.7. Finally, we assumed that 
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Table 1: Expenditure of the Central Government and Public Social Security Institutions by Function (in percentage of GDP) 
 
Year Education  Health  Social  Security 
and Assistance 







  1985 1.5 0.9 8.9 0.0 0.2  11.5 9.3  20.8 
  1990 1.7 1.3  10.4 0.0 0.2  13.7 8.7  22.4 
  1991 1.6 1.4  11.3 0.0 0.2  14.6 8.1  22.6 
  1992 1.7 1.5  12.2 0.1 0.2  15.6 8.1  23.8 
  1993 1.9 1.5  13.5 0.1 0.2  17.2 7.9  25.0 
  1994 2.0 1.9  13.4 0.1 0.1  17.5 7.8  25.3 
  1995 1.9 1.8  13.9 0.5 0.2  18.3 7.2  25.6 
  1996 1.8 1.8  14.0 0.5 0.3  18.4 6.7  25.0 
  1997 1.8 1.8  13.8 0.4 0.3  18.1 7.0  25.1 
  1998 1.8 1.9  13.8 0.5 0.3  18.3 7.1  25.4 
  1999 2.2 2.0  15.6 0.5 0.2  20.5 8.1  28.6 
  2000 2.2 2.0  15.8 0.5 0.4  21.0 8.1  29.0 
  2001 2.4 2.2  15.9 0.5 0.4  21.4 9.3  30.8 
  2002 2.4 1.9  15.8 0.4 0.4  20.9  10.4  31.3 
Notes: (1) Medical subsidies of Family Allowances given by the BPS are included since 1989. 
  (2) Data from CGN was substituted by data from Public Social Security Institutions (BPS, SRPM, SRPP). 
  (3) Social Assistance Expenses of the Central Government are included since 1999. 
  (4) Total Expenditure of the BPS does not include illness insurance (DISSE) nor medical subsidies of Family Allowances program. 
 
Source: Based on data from BPS, INE and BCU.   36 
 
Table 2: Expenditure of the Social Security System by Function (in percentage of GDP) 
 













 1986  8.4  0.1  0.8  0.6  0.6 0.0  0.0  0.1  10.7 
 1990  9.8  0.2  1.1  0.5  0.5 0.2  0.0  0.0  12.3 
 1991  10.8  0.2  1.3  0.4  0.6 0.2  0.0  0.0  13.6 
 1992  11.8  0.2  1.2  0.4  0.6 0.2  0.0  0.0  14.5 
 1993  12.9  0.3  1.5  0.4  0.8 0.2  0.0  0.0  16.1 
 1994  13.1  0.3  1.5  0.4  0.8 0.3  0.0  0.0  16.3 
 1995  13.5  0.4  1.6  0.4  0.8 0.2  0.0  0.0  17.0 
 1996  13.5  0.3  1.5  0.5  0.9 0.2  0.0  0.0  17.0 
 1997  13.6  0.3  1.7  0.5  0.8 0.2  0.0  0.0  17.1 
 1998  13.6  0.3  1.8  0.5  0.8 0.2  0.0  0.0  17.3 
 1999  14.7  0.4  1.9  0.5  0.9 0.2  0.0  0.0  18.7 
 2000  14.7  0.5  1.8  0.6  0.9 0.2  0.0  0.0  18.8 
 2001  14.9  0.5  1.8  0.5  0.9 0.2  0.0  0.0  19.0 
 2002  14.7  0.6  1.6  0.6  1.0 0.1  0.0  0.4  19.0 
 2003  12.7  0.3  1.5  0.5  1.0 0.1  0.1  0.2  16.5 
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Table 3: Expenditure of the Social Security System by Institution (in percentage of GDP) 
 
Public System  Private System  Year Total 
Total Public  Army  Police  BPS  Total Private  Banks  Professionals  Notaries 
  1985  Na 9.7 0.9 0.5 8.3 Na Na Na Na 
 1990  12.3  11.4  0.8  0.5  10.2 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.1 
 1991  13.6  12.5  0.7  0.4  11.4 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.1 
 1992  14.5  13.4  0.8  0.4  12.2 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.1 
 1993  16.1  14.8  1.1  0.6  13.1 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.1 
 1994  16.3  14.9  1.0  0.6  13.3 1.4 0.9 0.3 0.1 
 1995  17.0  15.5  1.1  0.6  13.8 1.5 1.0 0.3 0.1 
 1996  17.0  15.5  1.1  0.6  13.8 1.5 1.0 0.4 0.1 
 1997  17.1  15.5  1.1  0.6  13.7 1.6 1.1 0.4 0.2 
 1998  17.3  15.6  1.2  0.6  13.8 1.7 1.1 0.4 0.2 
 1999  18.7  16.9  1.2  0.6  15.0 1.8 1.2 0.5 0.2 
 2000  18.8  16.9  1.2  0.7  15.0 1.9 1.2 0.5 0.2 
 2001  19.0  17.0  1.3  0.7  15.0 2.0 1.3 0.5 0.2 
 2002  19.0  16.7  1.3  0.7  14.7 2.4 1.3 0.9 0.2 
 2003  16.4  14.4  1.1  0.6  12.7 2.0 1.3 0.5 0.2 
 
Source: Based on data from BPS, INE and BCU. 
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Table 4: Own Resources, Expenditure and Deficit of BPS (in percentage of GDP) 
 
Own Resources  Year 
Contributions and other incomes Affected  taxes 
Expenditure Deficit 
 1985  5.6  0.0  8.3  2.7 
 1990  7.8  1.6  10.2  0.8 
 1991  8.6  1.4  11.4  1.4 
 1992  9.2  1.5  12.2  1.5 
 1993  8.8  2.0  13.1  2.2 
 1994  8.7  2.1  13.3  2.6 
 1995  8.5  2.1  13.8  3.1 
 1996  8.2  2.1  13.8  3.4 
 1997  8.0  2.2  13.7  3.6 
 1998  8.0  2.3  13.8  3.5 
 1999  8.6  2.3  15.0  4.2 
 2000  8.4  2.1  15.0  4.5 
 2001  7.9  2.6  15.0  4.6 
 2002  7.2  2.7  14.7  4.9 
 2003  6.1  2.8  12.7  3.8 
 
Source: Based on data from BPS, INE and BCU. 
 
Table 5: Households receiving pensions (2003) 
Pensions as a share of total earnings (in percent)  Decile  Incidence (in percent) 
All households  Pensioners’ households 
 1  24.4  10.3  42.4 
 2  35.2  14.6  41.5 
 3  39.3  18.3  46.6 
 4  49.5  23.3  47.1 
 5  54.1  26.4  48.8 
 6  55.3  27.7  50.2 
 7  57.7  29.9  51.8 
 8  59.2  30.2  51.1 
 9  56.7  30.6  53.9 
 10  54.3  28.1  51.8 
 Total  48.5  23.9  49.3 
 
Source: Own computations based on the household survey. 




Table 6: Size and age of households receiving pensions (2003) 
 
Distribution of number of members of the household (in percent)  Decile 
1  2  More than 2 
Average age of the 
household 
 1  0.7  8.9  90.4  33.4 
 2  2.8  16.5  80.7  41.4 
 3  8.4  28.0  63.6  49.6 
 4  13.1  34.1  52.8  54.1 
 5  17.1  41.7  41.3  57.4 
 6  23.5  42.8  33.7  60.2 
 7  33.2  40.2  26.7  63.5 
 8  36.0  38.7  25.3  63.5 
 9  42.0  36.1  21.9  64.1 
 10  47.9  35.3  16.8  66.0 
 Total  25.4  34.6  40.0  57.6 
 
Source: Own computations based on the household survey. 
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Table 7: The Contribution of Several Sources of Income to Total Inequality (2003) 
 
Estimation 1: Indirect Taxes Proportional to Total Earnings  Estimation 2: Indirect Taxes Proportional to Expenditure 
Sources of Income 
Contribution to 
Inequality  












Ratio of Standard 
Deviations 
Labor Income, dependent formal 
workers  8.23 0.23 0.35 7.31  0.23  0.32 
Labor Income, dependent 
informal  workers  0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02  0.00  0.05 
Labor Income, self employed  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.02 
Unemployment Insurance   
b/ -0.26  -0.21    0.01  -0.13  -0.11  0.01 
Pensions   
b/ -11.99  -0.48  0.25  -5.01  -0.24  0.20 
Family Allowances  
b/ c/ -0.08  -0.55  0.00  -0.04  -0.36  0.00 
Other Government Transfers  
b/ d/ -3.70  -0.52  0.07  -1.91  -0.32  0.06 
Other Sources of Income  
e/  107.71 0.97  1.11  99.71 0.97 1.03 
TOTAL  100.00 1.00  1.00  100.00 1.00 1.00 
Notes: a/ The contribution of the income source Yi to total inequality is the slope in the regression of Yi on Y. See Shorrocks (1982) 
  b/ Government transfers are net of taxes. i.e. benefits minus taxes paid to finance the program (see appendix B for the details) 
  c/ Based on an estimation done by INE. 
  d/ Donations, subsidies, scholarships, accidents compensations, divorce contributions, “hogar constituido”. 
  e/ Interests, rents, profits, severance payments, gains, remittances from abroad, other sources of income. 
 
Source: Own computations on the household survey   41 
 
Table 8: Taxes paid as a share of households' earnings (in percent) 
 
Deciles IVA IMESI IRP  Total 
  1  9.1 1.6 0.6  11.3 
  2  8.2 1.3 1.3  10.7 
  3  7.7 1.5 1.4  10.6 
  4  7.3 1.6 1.6  10.5 
  5  7.1 1.5 1.8  10.4 
  6  6.5 1.4 1.8 9.7 
  7  6.9 1.6 2.1  10.5 
  8  6.7 1.4 1.9  10.0 
  9  6.5 1.4 1.7 9.6 
  10  5.7 1.3 1.3 8.3 
Source: Grau and Lagomarsino (2002) 
 
Table 9: Old Age pension indexation in selected Lac and OECD countries 
a/ 
LAC  Indexation system  OECD  Indexation system 
Argentina   AD  Austria    AD 
Bolivia   P  Belgium      P 
Brazil   P  Canada      P 
Chile   P  Denmark      W 
Costa Rica    P/W  Finland    P/W 
Colombia   P  France      P 
Guatemala   P/W  Germany    W 
Ecuador   P/W  Ireland      AD 
El Salvador 
/b   P Italy    P 
México   P  Japan    P 
Nicaragua   W  Luxembourg    P 
Panama   AD  Netherlands    W 
Paraguay   P  Norway    P/W 
Perú   P  Portugal    P 
Rep. Dominicana    W  Spain    P 
Ururguay   W  Sweden    P/W 
Venezuela   P/W  Switzerland    P/W 
  United  Kingdom    P 
  United  States    P 
Notes:  W indicates indexation to wages, P indicates indexation to prices, P/W a mix of price  
  and wage indexation , and AD indexation ad hoc system. 
 
  a/ Indexation rule of pensions for people already in retirement in the large system. 
  b/ Guaranteed minimum pension is adjusted annually according to changes in the 
 average  salary 
 
Sources: Based on data from: Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe, 2002, and The 




Table 10: Description of Simulated Scenarios for Pensions   a/ 
 
  Base Indexation  Base  Wage  Automatic adjustment to life expectancy 
  1 2 3  4  5  6  7 
1. Indexation of pensions   wages   prices    Wages/prices    wages   wages   wages    wages 
2. Wage base /b   Last 10/best 20  Last 10/best 20  Last 10/best 20  All work history    Last 10/best 20    Last 10/best 20  Last 10/best 20 
3. Minimum age for retirement            
 3.1  Males   60   60   60    60  Age of death –16   60    60 
 3.2  Females   60   60   60    60  Age of death –20   60    60 
4. Work history of males            
  Actual working ages /c    24 to 65/66    24 to 65/66    24 to 65/66    24 to 65/66    24 to 65/67   24 to (age of death –11)    24 to 65/66 
  Declared working ages    29 to 63/64    29 to 63/64    29 to 63/64    29 to 63/64    29 to 63/65    29 to (age of death –13)    29 to 63/64 
  Age when the pension is granted   60/64   60/64   60/64    60/64    64/66    Age of death –12   60/64 
5. Work history of females            
  Actual working ages    24 to 60/64    24 to 60/64    24 to 60/64    24 to 60/64    24 to 60/65   24 to (age of death –17)    24 to 60/64 
  Declared working ages    27 to 59/63    27 to 59/63    27 to 59/63    27 to 59/63    27 to 59/64   29 to (age of death –18)    27 to 59/63 
  Age when the pension is granted   60/64   60/64   60/64    60/64    60/65    Age of death -17   60/64 
6.  Rate of replacement    Law 16.713    Law 16.713    Law 16.713    Law 16.713    Law 16.713    Law 16.713  Adjusted to life 
expectancy 
Notes: /a Variations with respect to the base scenario are highlighted in bold. 
  /b Wage base on which benefits are calculated. 
  /c 65/66 means that some generations work until they are 65 and somo do it until they are 66. Analogous for other parameters of the work history. 
 
Source: Own computations. 
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Table 11: Fiscal Impact of several policy changes to the pensions program (millions of 2003 dollars) 
 
 
SHORT RUN (2005)  LONG RUN (2005-2050) 
a/   




1. Indexation of pensions (currently to wages)            
  1.1 Pensions indexed to CPI    -9    1    -10    -30    0    -30  3 
  1.2 Pensions indexed to (0.5*CPI+0.5*W)    -5    0    -5    -15    0    -15  3 
2. Pension Base Wage          
  Whole work history    -2    -2    0    -18    -1    -17  2 
3. Life-expectancy adjusted parameters         
  3.1 Minimum retirement age    0    0    0    -1    3    -4  2 
  3.2 Average retirement age    0    1    -1    -6    8    -15  2 
  3.3 Rate of replacement    0    -2    2    -12    -1    -11  2 
Notes: a/  Average impact per year discounted at an annual rate of 3.8%. 
  b/ 0=little or no political difficulty (can be done administratively without arising much opposition) 
  1=moderate difficulty (needs strong determination by executive branch; may or may not require change in legislation) 
  2=difficult (typically requires change in law and faces strong opposition to the extent where losers may have to be compensated in some way to make 
  it politically feasible to implement; vigorous public relations campaign will also be necessary in most cases) 
  3=very difficult (requires a major change in culture. laws and/or constitution and has strong opposition from vested groups – will require very strong 
  leadership feasible to implement and is likely to take years to build up consensus) 
 
Source: Own computations.   44 
 
 
Table 12: Equity impact of several pensions policy reforms (Change in the generational account caused by the policy reform measured in years of wages  
at 55 years old. Positive values mean losses for the worker) 
 
MALES FEMALES   
High income  Medium income  Low income  High income  Medium income  Low income 
1. Indexation of pensions (currently to wages)             
  1.1 Pensions indexed to CPI             
  Average  generations  1940-1949  0.24 0.34 0.34  0.33  0.45 1.46 
  Average  generations  2000-2009  0.16 0.34 0.41  0.19  0.40 1.53 
  1.2 Pensions indexed to (0.5*CPI+0.5*W)             
  Average  generations  1940-1949  0.12 0.18 0.18  0.17  0.23 0.75 
  Average  generations  2000-2009  0.08 0.17 0.21  0.10  0.21 0.79 
2. Pension Base Wage          
  Whole  work  history          
  Average  generations  1940-1949  0.00 0.43 0.11  0.00  0.26 0.00 
  Average  generations  2000-2009  0.00 0.31 0.18  0.00  0.22 0.00 
3. Life-expectancy adjusted parameters          
  3.1 Minimum retirement age             
  Average generations 1940-1949  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Average generations 2000-2009  0.22  0.34  0.40  0.18  0.23  0.01 
  3.2 Average retirement age             
  Average  generations  1940-1949  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
  Average  generations  2000-2009  0.46 0.71 0.77  0.28  0.38 0.09 
  3.3 Rate of replacement             
  Average  generations  1940-1949  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.29 0.00 
  Average  generations  2000-2009  0.25 0.53 0.18  0.30  0.63 0.00 
 
Source: own computations. 
 




Table 13: Projection of the Expenditure of the BPS in the Unemployment Insurance Program (in 
percentage of GDP) 
 
Year  Estimation 1  Estimation 2 
 2002  0.52  0.52 
 2003  0.28  0.28 
 2004  0.22  0.23 
 2005  0.21  0.22 
 2006  0.20  0.22 
 2007  0.19  0.21 
 2008  0.18  0.20 
 2009  0.17  0.20 
 2010  0.16  0.19 
 2011  0.16  0.18 
 2012  0.15  0.17 
 
Source: own computations. See the appendix for the details. 
 
 
Table 14: Duration of the unemployment subsidy  
(Number of new recipients of the unemployment subsidy classified by duration of the subsidy) 
 
Annual average  Percentage  Year 
Less than 2 
months 
From 2 to 4 
months 
More than 4 
months 
Less than 2 
months 
From 2 to 4 
months 
More than 4 
months 
  1993   770   676    2707  18.54  16.28  65.18 
  1994   590   591    2923  14.38  14.40  71.22 
  1995   679   803    3717  13.06  15.45  71.49 
  1996   530   576    3120  12.54  13.63  73.83 
  1997   429   398    3127  10.85  10.07  79.08 
  1998   608   486    3212  14.12  11.29  74.59 
  1999   1029    719   3939  18.09  12.64  69.26 
  2000   896   600    4438  15.10  10.11  74.79 
  2001   917   637    4553  15.02  10.43  74.55 
  2002   1027    733   5955  13.31  9.50  77.19 
 
Source: BPS 
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Table 15: Share of the unemployed who were receiving the unemployment subsidy (2002) 
 
  Coverage (in percent) 
Role in the family   
  Heads of household  14.0 
  No heads of household  4.2 
Gender   
 Males  8.9 
 Females  4.2 
Region/Income level   
 Montevideo  7.8 
  Low  income    6.2 
  Low-middle  income  7.9 
  Middle-high  income  9.5 
  High  income  7.4 
  Rest of the country  3.3 
Age   
  Less than 20  0.3 
  20 to 39  4.7 
  30 to 39  10.0 
  40 and more  9.5 
 
Source: Own computations on the household survey.   47 
 
 
Table 16: Recipients of Unemployment Subsidies (annual average) 
 
Source of data: household surveys (ECH)  
a/  Sources of data: BPS, Caja Bancaria  
Recipients of the subsidy who are ... 
Unoccupied Occupied   
b/ Total  ECH 
Recipients of 
the subsidy 
















(% of unemployed) 
  1993   2635  2.50   5086  0.44   7721  16070  15.25 
  1994   3124  2.58   5697  0.48   8821  18107  14.95 
 1995   6201  4.51    8563  0.71    14764  21686  15.77 
 1996   7844  4.93    7754  0.66    15598  19258  12.10 
 1997   8075  5.33    4221  0.36    12296  17100  11.29 
 1998   5323  4.30    4856  0.44    10179  17652  14.26 
 1999   6431  4.67    8981  0.83    15412  23384  16.98 
 2000   7027  4.19    8754  0.82    15781  26200  15.62 
 2001   10993  5.69    8717  0.81    19710  31340  16.22 
  2002    13143  6.22    11733  1.13    24876   37302  17.65 
  2003    9633  4.62    7224  0.70    16857  22767  10.92 
Notes: a/ The design of the sample was changed in January 1998. 
The percentages are computed using the ECH and the number of individuals are obtained multiplying those percentages by the 
number of unemployed (occupied) workers reported by the INE in "Uruguay en Cifras 2004". 
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Table 17: Unemployment Categories (2002) 
 
  Number of 
individuals 
Percent of the 
unemployed 
1. Searching job for the first time    35836  16.96 
2. Unemployed that do not receive the subsidy    162321  76.82 
  2.1. Had not been working for less than one year    96839  45.83 
  2.1.1. Public Sector    2451  1.16 
 2.1.1.1.  Informal    1226  0.58 
 2.1.1.2.  Formal    1225  0.58 
  2.1.2. Private Sector    94388  44.67 
 2.1.2.1.  Informal    74948  35.47 
 2.1.2.2.  Formal    19440  9.20 
  (i)  Self-employed and firm owners    1902  0.90 
 (ii)  Dependent    17538  8.30 
  2.2. Had not been working for more than one year    65482  30.99 
3. Unemployed receiving the subsidy    13143  6.22 
4. Total    211300  100.00 
Note: The percentages are computed using the ECH and the number of individuals iare 
obtained multiplying those percentages by the number of unemployed workers reported by 
the INE in "Uruguay en Cifras 2004". 
 
Source: Own computations from the household survey. 
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Table 18: Employment  
 
   2001 2002  2003 
   Number of 
individuals 








Percent of the 
Occupied 
1. Public Sector    75371  15.2    178012  16.1    174274  16.2 
2. Private Sector    78076  84.8    926273  83.9    903551  83.8 
  2.1. Formal Sector (contribute to SS)    82982  41.9    433897  39.3    401437  37.2 
 2.1.1.  Dependent    86983  33.6    343344  31.1    321682  29.8 
  (i)  Domestic Service    40936  3.5    36061  3.3    36174  3.4 
  (ii)  Employees in the Banking System    10088  0.9    10292  0.9    8183  0.8 
 (iii)  Others    335959  29.1  296991  26.9  277325  25.7 
  2.1.2. Self-employed and firm owners    95999  8.3    90553  8.2    79755  7.4 
  2.2. Informal Sector (do not contribute to SS)    495094  42.9    492376  44.6    502114  46.6 
3. Total    1153447  100.0    1104285  100.0    1077825  100.0 
 




Table 19: Coverage of the Unemployment Insurance Programs in Latin America  
(Percentage of total unemployed according to administrative records) 
 
Country Year  Coverage 
Argentina   1995-2000  10.0 
Brazil   2000  11.8 
Chile   2000 6.7   
Uruguay   1995-2000 14.3 
   1995  15.8 
   1996  12.1 
   1997  11.3 
   1998  14.3 
   1999  17.0 
   2000  15.6 
Venezuela   1999  7.2 
 
Sources: Velásquez (2003a). and own computations based on information from BPS and INE. 
 
Table 20: Coverage of the Unemployment Insurance Programs
/a in selected OECD countries  













New Zeland  12.96 
Slovak Republic  3.15 
Spain 3.91 
Sweden 7.18 
United Kingdom  6.38 
United States  3.83 
Note: 
a/ Unemployment benefits refers to benefits – except for those which are  primarily 
disability or lone parent benefits – that are paid conditional upon the person being 
available to work. Means-tested benefits are not included here. Only periodic benefits 
that are paid in the event of a loss of earnings are included, which are referred to as 
earnings or income replacing benefits. Lump sum cash benefits are not included. 
 
Source: Own computations based on information from OECD. 
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Table 21: Number of new recipients of the unemployment insurance subsidy  
(annual average) 
 
  Application founded on: 
Year Dismissal  Suspension  Reduction 
  1993   1496  2601   56 
  1994   1859  2194   51 
  1995   2161  3012   26 
  1996   2065  2130   32 
  1997   2218  1713   23 
  1998   2283  1999   23 
 1999    2518    3152    18 
  2000   2555  3372   5 
  2001   2266  3839   2 








Table 22: Proposals to Reform the BPS Unemployment Insurance Program 
 
  
Current law a/  Bill of the Executive 
b/ 
Minister of Labor 
c/ 
Velásquez (OIT) d/  Stand by WB 
e/ 
ERT-BPS f/  Encuentro 




Coverage Dependent workers 
in the private 
sector. save 
domestic service.  
            All dependent 
workers in the 





Eligibility (i) Worker is fired; 
or (ii) working time 
is reduced by 25% 
or more; or (iii) the 
firm "suspends the 
activity".  
Contributions 
during 6 of the last 
12 months.  
No other sources of 
income.  
Contributions during 
9, rather than 6, of 
the 12 months 
previous to 
unemployment. 













100 SMN or 
more are not 
eligible. 
Workers must have 
contributed no less 
than 6 of the last 24 
months (the BPS 
can raise this figure 
to 36). After using 
the whole period, 
workers become 
eligible again after 
6 months 
contributing. 
     
Amount  The subsidy is 
equal to half the 
average wage 
during the 6 
months previous to 
unemployment. 
with a lower bound 
of half the national 
minimum salary 
(SMN) and an 
upper bound of 8 
SMN.  
   The amount of the 
subsidy is 
decreasing along 






The amount of the 




indexed to private 
wages rather than to 
the SMN. The last 12 
wages are used to 







rate is raised to 
60% and the BPS is 
authorized to raise 
it further up to 
80%. The minimum 
subsidy is 5 UR and 
the maximum is 50 
UR.  
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Stand by WB 
e/ 





Period  The subsidy is 
paid during 6 
months. but the 
government can 
extend this period 
12 additional 
months. 
"Account" that registers 
the number of months 
the worker is entitled to 
enjoy the subsidy: one 
month per year of age 
above 20 and half a 
month per year of 
contributions. The 
account is reduced when 
the worker receives the 
subsidy. 
Subsidy paid after 
severance payments. in 
case of separation. 
Nine months. A 
worker who 
never used the 
program. can get 
36 months as 
anticipated 
retirement. 
Six months and no 
extensions.  
Six months and 
no extensions. 





The BPS can 
extend the period 
up to 12 months 
for workers aged 
50 or more. 
belonging to 
households with 
income below 24 
UR. or workers of 
insolvent firms (or 
firms with labor 









Funding  Payroll and 
general taxes. 
The employer must pay a 
special contribution 
equivalent to a month of 
salary. if the application 
is based on the 
suspension of the 
activity. 
Firms contribute 
according to the 
use they make of 
the program. 
           
  
Other 
     
 Recipients of 
the 
subsidy should 


















and actively search 
for jobs. 









recipients of the 
unemployment 
subsidy.  
Sources: a/ Decree-law 15.180. b/ The project of the Executive Power is not directly available. We could only learn of it through Velásquez (2003b). c/ Article 
from El Observador (2004) based on a press conference given by the Minister of Labor. d/ Velásquez (2003b) e/ The document is not directly available. We could 
only learn of it through Oiz Marquéz (2002) f/ Equipo de Representación de los Trabajadores en el BPS (1999) g/ Encuentro Progresista – Frente Amplio (1999) 
h/ Partido Nacional (2004).   54 
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Figure 2: The purchasing power of pensions with two different indexation schemes  
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Figure 4: The Contribution of Pensions to Inequality Computing Net Transfers 
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